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Abstract
Tipping points have become a key concept in research on climate change, indicating points of
abrupt transition in biophysical systems as well as transformative changes in adaptation and
mitigation strategies. However, the potential existence of tipping points in socio-economic systems
has remained underexplored, whereas theymight be highly policy relevant. This paper describes
characteristics of climate change induced socio-economic tipping points (SETPs) to guide future
research on SETPS to inform climate policy.We review existing literature to create a tipping point
typology and to derive the following SETP deﬁnition: a climate change induced, abrupt change of a
socio-economic system, into a new, fundamentally different state. Through stakeholder consulta-
tion, we identify 22 candidate SETP examples with policy relevance for Europe. Three of these are
described in higher detail to identify their tipping point characteristics (stable states, mechanisms
and abrupt change): the collapse of winter sports tourism, farmland abandonment and sea-level
rise-inducedmigration.We ﬁnd that stakeholder perceptions play an important role in
describing SETPs. The role of climate drivers is difﬁcult to isolate from other drivers because of
complex interplays with socio-economic factors. In some cases, the rate of change rather than
themagnitude of change causes a tipping point. The clearest SETPs are found on small system
scales. On a national to continental scale, SETPs are less obvious because they are difﬁcult to
separate from their associated economic substitution effects and policy response. Some proposed
adaptationmeasures are so transformative that their implementations can be considered an SETP
in terms of ‘response to climate change’. Future research can focus on identiﬁcation and impact
analysis of tipping points using stylizedmodels, on the exceedance of stakeholder-deﬁned critical
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1. Introduction
In climate change research and communication, the
concept of tipping points has receivedmuch attention.
In the natural sciences, it articulates conditions at
which the state of complex systems can abruptly alter
as a result of small perturbations (Russill and
Nyssa 2009). Concerns have been expressed about
passing critical thresholds of large-scale elements of
the climate system (Lenton et al 2008, Steffen et al
2018), although there is high uncertainty about the
temperature thresholds at which these events occur
(Kriegler et al 2009, Levermann et al 2012). Even small
changes in climatic conditions can tip ecological
systems to alternative states which can be hard to
reverse (Scheffer and Carpenter 2003). Beyond the
natural sciences, the notion of adaptation tipping
points is used to assess under what conditions policies
are no longer able to achieve their objectives, requiring
additional action (Kwadijk et al 2010, Haasnoot et al
2013, Werners et al 2013). In the transformation and
transition literature, tipping points indicate transfor-
mative changes in adaptation or mitigation strategies
(Wise et al 2014, David Tàbara et al 2018, Farmer et al
2019). Besides their scientiﬁc use, tipping points have
become a popular metaphor to communicate climate
change impacts and their far-reaching consequences
to a wider audience (Russill and Nyssa 2009, van der
Hel et al 2018).
Various studies have given an overview of tipping
points in environmental systems, such as the climate
system (Schellnhuber et al 2006, Lenton et al 2008,
Levermann et al 2012), ecological systems (Scheffer
and Carpenter 2003) and the universal warning signals
these systems exhibit (Scheffer et al 2009, Ratajczak
et al 2018). These studies have a strong focus on the
biophysical sphere, and only incidentally touch upon
the socio-economic. There is an emerging ﬁeld on tip-
ping points in coupled socio-ecological systems (Milk-
oreit et al 2018, Reyers et al 2018). Here, a tipping
point is deﬁned as: ‘a threshold at which small quantita-
tive changes in the system trigger a nonlinear change pro-
cess that is driven by system-internal feedback
mechanisms and inevitably leads to a qualitatively
different state of the system, which is often irreversible’
(Milkoreit et al 2018, p 11). However, in nearly all
studies on coupled socio-ecological systems, the
regime shift is located in the ecological rather than the
socio-economic domain (Filatova et al 2016). In line
with this observation, several authors have identiﬁed a
lack of studies on tipping points in the socio-economic
domain, whereas they might be highly policy relevant
in the context of climate change (Filatova et al 2016,
Kopp et al 2016, Biggs et al 2018, Kabir et al 2018,
Milkoreit et al 2018).
The objective of the paper is therefore to help to ﬁll
this gap and describe the characteristics of climate-
induced socio-economic tipping points (SETPs), in
order to guide future research on assessments of these
SETPs for informing adaptation and mitigation pol-
icy. We do so in three steps. First, we conduct a litera-
ture review to create a typology of different branches
of the tipping point literature and to deﬁne and char-
acterize the SETPs in the perspective of this literature
(section 3). Second, we report on a stakeholder con-
sultation that was undertaken to identify examples of
SETPs with policy relevance on a European scale and
to explore their characteristics (section 4). Third,
based on the literature review and stakeholder con-
sultation, we provide suggestions for future research
on the assessment of societal impacts of SETPs in
order to inform adaptation and mitigation policies
(sections 5 and 6).
2.Methods
This paper combines two methods: literature review
and stakeholder consultation.
2.1. Literature review
The literature review was structured along two criteria
emerging from existing review articles (table SI 1.1
available online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/15/023001/
mmedia):
(1) The type of systems on which the tipping point
concept is applied: e.g. physical, biological and
social systems, which is a major source of discus-
sion on tipping point deﬁnitions (Russill and
Nyssa 2009, Russill 2015).
(2) The characteristics of tipping point deﬁnitions:
e.g. stable states, abruptness, feedbacks and lim-
ited reversibility (Milkoreit et al 2018).
We searched ‘Tipping Point*’ AND ‘Climat*
Chang*’ in the Web-of-Science core collection data-
base (n=508) (table SI 1.2), enriched by forward and
backward citation tracking. To address criterion 1, this
literature was positioned in a diagrammatic repre-
sentation of systems exhibiting tipping points
(ﬁgures 1, 3), after Barker (2003). To address criterion
2, after Milkoreit et al (2018), three qualitative ques-
tions were answered for each branch of literature: (1)
How are system states distinguished? (2) What is the role
of mechanisms underlying state stabilisation and shifts?
(3) How is abruptness or nonlinearity deﬁned? In addi-
tion, the purpose and policy relevance of each branch
were addressed. The review process methodologically
followed Berrang-Ford et al (2015), see the supple-
mentary information, SI 1. This supplement also con-
tains an overview of model approaches used in studies
describing climate-induced tipping points in socio-
economic and coupled socio-ecological systems (table
SI 1.3).
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2.2. Stakeholder consultation
To derive an overview of policy relevant tipping points
in Europe, we organized a stakeholder workshop and
carried out 28 additional semi-structured interviews
resulting in a list of 22 SETP candidate examples (table
SI 2.1). The whole process followed a co-design and
co-delivery protocol and used a set of research co-
production success factors identiﬁed from the litera-
ture (Watkiss et al 2018). 24 stakeholders attended the
workshop, representing a variety of sectors in Europe,
including health, ﬁnance, public governance, tourism,
agriculture, transport, insurance and nature conserva-
tion. Workshop attendants were divided in ﬁve
thematic groups (table SI 2.2). Each group was asked
to draw an inventory of SETPs in their sector, followed
by a discussion on causal mechanisms. Similarly, the
28 semi-structured interviews (table SI 2.3) were used
to identify SETP examples, to get insight in the
mechanisms leading to their occurrence and to learn
about past experiences and policy recommendations
(table SI 2.4).
3. Literature review results: types of tipping
points
We identiﬁed four branches of tipping point literature,
that are further explained below (sections 3.1–3.4) and
summarized in table 1. In section 3.5, we create a
synthesis and typology of these, to deﬁne SETPs in
section 3.6. The literature on biophysical tipping
points is most substantial in size, the other branches
are smaller (ﬁgure 1).
3.1. Climate tipping points
Climate tipping points describe critical thresholds at
which large-scale components of the Earth’s climate
system, at least sub-continental in scale, switch to a
qualitatively different state due to a small perturbation
(Lenton et al 2008). The classic example is the potential
collapse of the North Atlantic deep water formation
and the associated Thermohaline Circulation (THC):
an ocean current mechanism which is a key determi-
nant of the global climate (Steﬂen et al 2004). Other
examples are: the self-amplifying melting of theWest-
Antarctic and Greenland ice-sheet, sea-ice melt in the
Arctic, and state changes in the El-Nino Southern
Oscillation (Levermann et al 2012, Lenton 2013).
Concerning stable states (characteristic 1 in
table 1), earlymodels of the THC described two clearly
distinguished stable ﬂow regimes and critical transi-
tions (or bifurcations) between them (Stommel 1961,
as cited by Lenton 2013), although there is still a debate
on whether unambiguous stable states can be dis-
tinguished (Caesar et al 2018, Thornalley et al 2018,
Nature Editorial 2018). The mechanisms (character-
istic 2 in table 1) causing different stable states, as well
as abrupt transitions between states, are reinforcing
and dampening feedback processes in the climate sys-
tem leading to nonlinear system behaviour. Abrupt-
ness (characteristic 3 in table 1) can be understood in
two ways: change is rapid compared to a geological
timescale or rapid compared to a policy-relevant time
horizon, such as 100 years (Lenton et al 2008, Kopp
et al 2016).
The policy relevance of climate tipping points is
mainly to inform about safe levels of climate change
with respect to temperature stabilisation. Climate tip-
ping points seem to have played a crucial role in the
history of the Earth, and therefore, they also might
have large impacts on current societies (Lenton 2013).
This is for example reﬂected in the IPCC Fifth Assess-
ment Report (IPCC 2014b)—with ‘large singular
events’ as one of the 5 ‘reasons for concern’ and in the
IPCC 1.5 °C-warming report (IPCC 2018). They also
have been used as major justiﬁcation for ambitious
mitigation policies (Knutti et al 2016, Lemoine and
Traeger 2016), such as the European Union Long-
Term Strategy (EC 2018). Framing of climate tipping
points is predominantly negative. They are often seen
as being beyond the limits of adaptation (Watkiss et al
2015), so they can only be addressed by insurance-like
mitigation (Weitzman 2014).
Figure 1.Development of different branches of tipping points (TPs) literature included in theweb-of-science core collection database
(from1 January, 2007, until 31December, 2018).
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Table 1.Characteristics of tipping points in four branches of literature.
Characteristics Climate tipping points Ecological tipping points Transformation tipping points Adaptation tipping points
Stable states (from
state A to state B)
Qualitatively different states of a large component
of the earth’s climate system (A: strong ocean
current; B: substantially weakened ocean
current)
Distinct dynamic regimes of an ecosystem (A:
oligotrophic lake state—‘good’water quality;
B: eutrophic lake state—‘poor’water quality)
Shift in uptake of ideas, technology etc. (A:
idea, technology or behaviour only for a
smallminority of ‘early adaptors’; B:
embraced bymany people, onmacro-level)
Formal or informal objective/performance
threshold is exceeded, requiring a change in
action (A: strategy 1; B: fundamentally differ-
ent strategy 2)
Mechanisms Internal system feedbacks explaining state chan-
ges aswell as stabilisation
Internal system feedbacks Diverse,mostlymarketmechanisms driven by
human behaviour
Crossing acceptability, technical or economic
threshold
Abruptness Rapid on geological timescale and potentially
relevant on a policy-relevant timescale
Rapid compared to typical change in the
ecosystem
Rapid change compared to normal uptake of
ideas or behaviour
Rapid change of policy or action
Other Irreversible fromhuman perspective Hysteresis: restoring original state through dif-
ferent trajectory
Positive framing: to be achieved Can be used to construct adaptation pathways to
meet objectives under changing conditions













3.2. Ecological tipping points
The second branch of literature is ecological tipping
points, better known as ‘critical transitions’ causing
‘regime shifts’ in biological or ecological systems
(Scheffer and Carpenter 2003, Biggs et al 2018). This
branch of literature ismuchwider than climate change
discourse alone, but here, we focus on climate related
examples. For example, increasing temperature and
nutrient concentrations can tip lakes into eutrophic
states (Scheffer et al 2015). Climate change could
potentially cause drought-induced vegetation shifts,
such as desertiﬁcation in the Sahara (Martínez-Vilalta
and Lloret 2016). Increasing CO2 concentrations may
shift coral reefs to entirely different ecosystems
(Hoegh-Guldberg et al 2007, Marzloff et al 2016,
IPCC 2018). These systems often exhibit hysteresis:
turning back to the original state is usually not possible
by simply reversing the conditions (de Zeeuw and
Li 2016).
Concerning stable states, the literature emphasises
that the term ‘dynamic regimes’ would be more
appropriate, because ecological systems are hardly
ever completely stable in the sense that no ﬂuctuations
occur (Scheffer et al 2001). Concerning mechanisms,
Van Nes et al (2016) distinguish two ways in which an
ecosystem can be tipped to an alternative state. The
ﬁrst mechanism is erosion of system resilience. Nor-
mally, a small perturbation would have been within
the coping capacity due to system resilience, but with
the resilience eroded, it can cause a state shift. This
highlights that many causal factors may have con-
tributed before a perturbation in one variable causes
the actual tipping to occur and these could have addi-
tive or even synergistic interactions (Scheffer and Car-
penter 2003, Ratajczak et al 2018). The second
mechanism is an unusual large perturbation in one
driver which on its own pushes the system over a cri-
tical point, from which it cannot return (Van Nes et al
2016). This literature emphasises that internal system-
feedbacks play a determining role in both the stabilisa-
tion and the rapid change between different dynamic
regimes (Scheffer et al 2001). The clearest examples of
tipping points are found in small-scale, heterogeneous
and strongly interconnected systems (Scheffer et al
2012). Abruptness is deﬁned as rapid change com-
pared to typical rates of change in the ecosystem
(Ratajczak et al 2018).
The policy relevance of this literature is that it gives
insights as to how a desired state of an ecosystem can
bemaintained or achieved by describing a ‘safe operat-
ing space’ (Scheffer et al 2015). For instance, prevent-
ing tipping points in iconic ecosystems such as coral
reefs received major attention in the recent 1.5 °C-
warming report (IPCC 2018). Monitoring and early
warning systems can be useful to indicate when eco-
systems approach a tipping point, noting these are also
relevant for climate tipping points (Scheffer et al 2009,
Wang et al 2012, Camarero et al 2015, Clements and
Ozgul 2018).
3.3. Transformation or transition tipping points
Whereas the above literature mainly draws on com-
plex dynamic systems theory, the literature about
transformation tipping points is more qualitative and
descriptive, i.e. closer to Gladwell’s (2000) popular
understanding of tipping points. The roots of this
literature are in innovation and change theory
(Rogers 1962) which studies why and how ideas and
trends spread. It seeks to build on thesemechanisms to
deliver transitions in society that meet the adaptation
and mitigation challenges posed by climate change
(Loorbach andRotmans 2006,Moser andDilling 2007,
van der Brugge 2009).
Distinction of clear stable states is emphasised less
in this body of literature. The tipping point is an
approximate indicator of the point separating a state A,
in which a new strategy, behaviour, idea or technology
is only adopted by a minority of early adopters, from a
state B, in which it is adopted by a largemajority (Loor-
bach and Rotmans 2006, Moser andDilling 2007, Pate-
naude 2011, Sperling 2018). Others deﬁne states as
institutional settings with different actors and altered
actor networks (Westley et al 2011, Fuchs and Tha-
ler 2017). In contrast to the biophysical literature, this
literature mainly talks about so-called ‘positive tipping
points’ (David Tàbara et al 2018): the envisioned state B
ismore desirable than the current state A.One difﬁculty
here is that only in retrospect, it is possible to properly
describe shifts as being radical (Fuchs and Thaler 2017).
Another complication is that these descriptions are sub-
jective; whereas transformative change may pose
opportunities for some stakeholders, it may be destruc-
tive for others, in particular those that depend on the
established system (Young 2012).
The mechanisms that could cause a shift towards a
‘fundamentally improved state’ (Burch et al 2017) are
diverse (Farmer et al 2019). In the mitigation domain,
these could include policy instruments or market for-
ces (EC 2018, Mercure et al 2018) as well as ﬁnancial
thresholds for competing technologies (IRENA 2018).
However, it can also arise via other means. Westley
et al (2011) highlight how institutional entrepreneurs
can lower the threshold between the current and the
envisioned state, causing tipping to occur. Geels and
Schot (2007) articulate that slowly changing drivers
may put pressure on an existing regime, so that at a
certain point a window of opportunity may cause a
breakthrough of a niche innovation. The policy rele-
vance of this literature is that it gives insights into how
governments could formulate policies and incentives
in order to achieve successful change towards societies
that embrace adaptation and mitigation strategies. It
provides checklists for the design of ‘transformative-
oriented’ climate policy (David Tàbara et al 2019,
Fazey et al 2018).
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3.4. Adaptation tipping points
The fourth branch is the climate adaptation literature.
Here, adaptation tipping points indicate thresholds
where the magnitude of climate change causes an
adaptation action to fail in meeting key performance
indicators, policy or management objectives (Kwadijk
et al 2010). The origins of this branch are in the
adaptation decision support literature and in part-
icular the focus on decision making under deep
uncertainty (Walker et al 2013, Ray and Brown 2015,
Watkiss et al 2015). This ﬁeld studies exceedance of
threshold conditions under different futures using
exploratory modelling approaches such as robust
decision making (Hall et al 2012) and scenario
discovery (Bryant and Lempert 2010). One of these
adaptation decision support approaches is ‘dynamic
adaptive policy pathways’, developed as a scenario-
neutral approach to policy making (Haasnoot et al
2013). In order to illustrate these pathways using
adaptation route-maps, the approach uses tipping
point terminology to indicate the ‘best-before’ dates of
policy actions for meeting a plan’s objectives. It is best
known from coastal and water management applica-
tions such as the Dutch Delta Program (Bloemen et al
2018) and the London Thames Estuary project (Ran-
ger et al 2013), but has also been applied to other
sectors including agriculture and forestry (Petr et al
2015, Prober et al 2017).
State descriptions of performance of actions across
the pathway are binary: they either meet objectives
(state A) or fail (state B). Descriptions of these thresh-
olds can be formal, such as standards or laws, or infor-
mal, based on acceptability thresholds as assessed by
stakeholders. In climate adaptation studies, the mech-
anism causing an ‘adaptation tipping point’, i.e. the
exceedance of the threshold, is a change in climate
conditions (e.g. sea-level rise (SLR), river discharge),
causing a certain action or portfolio of actions to fail.
Although this is a sudden and therefore an obvious
nonlinear and abrupt switch, it does not necessarily
correspond to a nonlinearity in the physical or socio-
economic domain, nor does it have to be the result of
internal feedback mechanisms for state stabilisation
and change (Werners et al 2013, Kopp et al 2016).
However, some shifts in adaptation actions are so
transformative in nature that they could qualify as tip-
ping points consistent with the other branches of lit-
erature. This is, for instance, explicitly recognised in
the IPCC AR5 with the explicit deﬁnition of ‘transfor-
mational’ versus ‘incremental’ adaptation (Kates et al
2012, IPCC2014a).
3.5. Synthesis and typology
Based on the above analysis of the tipping point
literature, we propose the following typology of
tipping points for climate change (ﬁgure 2). The state
shifts have different positions in the cause-effect chain
from climate change to adaptation and/or mitigation,
as shown in ﬁgure 3. Climate tipping points highlight
that increasing greenhouse-gas concentrations may
trigger strong nonlinear responses of large elements of
the climate system. Ecological tipping points may have
climate change as one of their drivers, and describe
cases that lead to state shifts in ecological systems. For
both, the state shifts occur in the biophysical system.
Transformation tipping points reﬂect radical changes in
human response to the impacts or challenges of
climate change, and can lead to different mitigation or
adaptation strategies, while also some of the adaptation
tipping points reﬂect climate-induced exceedance of
criteria or policy thresholds requiring transformative
adaptation.Note that the literature explicitlymentions
adaptation tipping points, but not mitigation tipping
points. This notwithstanding the ample research
addressing the huge technological and behavioural
changes implied by decarbonisation pathways leading
to a 2 or 1.5 °C warming world. Transformational
response, encompassing adaptation and mitigation,
describes shifts in terms of climate action (by policy
makers, private companies or individuals). We thus
summarize adaptation and mitigation tipping points
under the umbrella of transformational response to
climate change, resting in the socioeconomic domain
(ﬁgure 2).
Note that we contrast these tipping points in terms
of transformational response (ﬁgure 3, top-right) with
tipping points in terms of socio-economic impact
(ﬁgure 3, bottom-right). Although both occur in the
socio-economic system, the state shifts result fromdif-
ferent mechanisms. Impact refers to cases where a
state shift occurs in the socio-economic structure due
to autonomous climate change and inaction or insufﬁ-
cient action from the human side. Response refers to
cases where the socio-economic structure is deliber-
ately and fundamentally altered, or planned to be
altered, by human action, in anticipation or response
to (potential) impacts (see Kates et al 2012). Also, an
abrupt shift in response (such as a global carbon tax)
may take a long time before it materializes in socio-
economic beneﬁts, whereas the consequences of an
impact tipping point may directly hit the economy. In
summary, SETPs encompass socio-economic impact
tipping points, adaptation tipping points and mitiga-
tion tipping points.
3.6.Deﬁning climate change induced SETPs
From the above exploration, we are now ready to
deﬁne a climate change induced SETP. It is ‘a climate
change induced, abrupt change of a socio-economic
system, into a new, fundamentally different state
(beyond a certain threshold that stakeholders perceive
as critical).’ These have the following characteristics:
(1) Stable states: substantially different, more-or-less
stable states or dynamic regimes at either side of some
critical threshold. This distinction can be made
qualitatively: showing by narrative how state A is
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fundamentally different from state B, or quantita-
tively: showing an S-shaped nonlinearity between
climate drivers and socio-economic indicators. (2)
Mechanism explaining nonlinear behaviour. One
should be able to provide a rationale—e.g. a causal
pathway—on why these states are more or less stable
and why there is a sudden transition between the two.
(3) Rapid, abrupt change. The state change should be
rapid compared to the change usually observed in the
system. Additionally, for the scope of this paper we
look for policy relevant examples where climate
change is a signiﬁcant driver of the tipping point. Also,
we focus on impact SETPs (rather than transforma-
tional response SETPs), because these seem to have
least coverage in the existing literature.
4. Stakeholder consultation results: SETP
examples in Europe
Stakeholder consultation identiﬁed 22 potential
SETPs with policy relevance for Europe (table SI 2.1).
Most frequently mentioned during the workshop (5 of
5 groups) was migration towards Europe, due to
adverse climate change impacts in other continents.
Most groups (3 of 5) also mentioned the reconﬁgura-
tion of the energy network due to the demand for
renewable energy. Other EU-wide examples were: the
introduction of new vectors causing the outbreak of
diseases; extreme heatmortality and labour productiv-
ity impacts due to increasing temperatures; and
cascading impacts of road network and supply chain
disruptions due to ﬂoods. Most of the examples had
adverse consequences (20 of 22); only the business
group came up with opportunities arising from
climate-induced market reconﬁgurations. In general,
the workshop attendees thought about tipping points
as large-impact events such as economic shocks and
were less concerned with the underlying system
dynamics (nonlinear behaviour, feedbacks, threshold
effects etc). Intentionally, the setting was one where
stakeholders should not be restricted by any concise
SETP deﬁnition and resulted in a comprehensive
collection of concerns. Consequently, not all the
introduced examples exhibit all tipping point
Figure 2.Typology of tipping points (TPs).
Figure 3.Diagrammatic representation of climate change, adaptation andmitigation showing the position of tipping points (TPs)
(systemblocks freely after Barker 2003, following IPCCAR3)Arrows indicate the archetypical cause-effect chain from increasing
greenhouse concentrations (left-top)which change the climate system (left-middle) and the state of ecosystems (left-bottom).
Biophysical changes in turn have an impact on the socio-economic system (right-bottom) and evoke a response of human actors
(right-top)whomay try to counter climate change (mitigation-arrow) or prevent it fromhaving an impact (adaptation-arrow).
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characteristics (table SI 2.1). However, several exam-
ples are promising SETP candidates, which often have
not yet been approached from the perspective of
tipping points in the existing literature. Below, we
elaborate on three of these, representing different
geographical locations, sectors, climate drivers and
spatial scales (table 2). In the last subsection we
generalize our ﬁndings by drawing from al 22
examples.
4.1.Winter sports tourism in low-altitudeAlpine
regions
Reduced snow conditions in Alpine regions are among
the most visible early impacts of climate change in
Europe. Numerous studies have identiﬁed amajor risk
to the Alpine winter sports industry (e.g. Köberl et al
2015, Marty et al 2017, Steiger et al 2017). In Austria,
recurring unfavourable snow conditions have led to
the collapse of several low-lying ski resorts (Falk 2013).
This has caused societal concerns because of the
economic signiﬁcance of the sector and its contrib-
ution to cultural identity (Interview #22, see table
SI 2.3).
The state (Characteristic 1, table 2) of an individual
resort can be described in terms of ﬁnancial proﬁt-
ability. The mechanism (Characteristic 2, table 2)
causing a state shift can be understood as follows.
When a resort does not succeed in making a proﬁt for
a number of successive years, it will reduce its reserves
and eventually make a decision to withdraw from the
sector, or in certain conditions, it may fall into bank-
ruptcy. As a rule of thumb, a resort needs 100 days of
good snow conditions a year to be ﬁnancially viable.
Based on this rule, the number of viable existing
resorts in the Alpine region could reduce from the
baseline 91% (in 2007) to 61% and 30% under warm-
ing of 0°, 2° and 4 °C, respectively (Abegg et al 2007, as
cited in Damm et al 2014). Bankruptcy could occur
abruptly (Characteristic 3, table 2), because there is
large intra-annual variability in snow conditions on
top of the slowly changing trend (Marke et al 2015). In
the immediate term, bankruptcy is not necessarily
irreversible, and some resorts have been successfully
reopened (Falk 2013), but in the face of climate
change, the viability of low-lying resorts for snow
tourism in the medium to long-term is fundamentally
irreversible, irrespective of supporting policies—e.g.
the government privatizing unproﬁtable ski lifts and
train lines (Interview#23).
From this case we take the following insights. First,
the question whether collapse of a ski resort can be
seen as a clear tipping point strongly depends on the
scale of analysis. On a village scale, the disappearance
of a resort may have large impacts, because a major
share of local income is derived from it. On a larger
spatial scale, the impacts are usually smaller because of
economic diversiﬁcation and substitution effects
when tourism and employment shift to other areas.
This is strongly region dependent (Abegg et al 2007), as
can be seen by comparing two Austrian regions: Styria
and Tyrol. Styria has many low-lying resorts but a
diverse economy, so that individual resorts are likely to
tip, but their overall economic impact may be limited.
In contrast, Tyrol is very much dependent on income
from winter tourism, but the resorts are situated at
much higher altitudes, making them less likely to tip
(Interview #22). Second, adaptation by artiﬁcial
snow-making may signiﬁcantly reduce the likelihood
of tipping by prolonging the skiing season in the short
or evenmedium term. However, this is very costly and
Table 2.Characteristics of selected climate-induced socio-economic tipping points.
Characteristics\case study Collapse of low-altitude ski resorts
Farmland abandonment and col-
lapse of agricultural sector
Coastal retreat due to sea-
level rise
Stable states (from state A
to fundamentally dif-
ferent state B)
A: resort is proﬁtable inmost years;
B: resort is notﬁnancially viable
tomaintain
A: farming is proﬁtable, lively rural
community; B: farmland is aban-
doned and rural area inhabited
declines
A: high exposure of popula-
tion and assets; B: low
exposure
Mechanism (that explains
state stability and non-
linear transitions)
A series of unfavourable snow years
(and rising snowmachine costs)
reduces proﬁtability with deple-
tion ofﬁnancial reserves
Reduced productivity andwater
limits cause supply and price
shocks andmakes farming
unproﬁtable; causing land aban-
donment and rural decline (feed-
back loop)
Forced displacement or relo-





The decision point to stop opera-
tions (including bankruptcy)
could be very sudden, following
an individual unfavourable year
High intensity or frequent droughts
could trigger or accelerate this
process
Displacement and relocation
following a disaster are
abrupt (in contrast to
slow-onsetmigration)
Key insights Reversibility: in the short term,
some resorts are successfully reo-
pened; in the long term, snow
line shift is irreversible (but
increased summer temperature
also creates opportunities)
Reversibility: very hard to return to
the previous state; in the long
term: alternative land use
possible
Human responsemay evoke
a ‘response to climate
change’ tipping point
before SETP takes place
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has large environmental impact. Thirdly, there is a
potential adaptation strategy to diversify. Several
regions are considering a more fundamental shift
towards gaining a large share of income from summer
tourism. For example, they seek to revive the ‘Som-
merfrische’, a historic fashion where rich families
retreated from cities to spend the hot summer at
higher altitudes (Interview #23). Whereas higher
temperatures threaten winter tourism, it may be
opportune in summer when people wish to escape the
hot cities in Southern Europe.
4.2. Farmland abandonment in Southern Europe
In Southern Europe, climate change is projected to
have disproportionally large impacts from the combi-
nation of higher temperatures and most likely lower
precipitation (Vautard et al 2014, IPCC 2014b), with
most studies showing large detrimental impacts on
agriculture (Ciscar et al 2014). In the past, large parts
of north-west and central Spain have seen widespread
abandonment of farmland and migration from rural
areas (Collantes et al 2014, Iglesias and Garrote 2017)
due to a complex interplay of socio-economic, geo-
graphical and environmental factors (Terres et al
2015). Interviewees expressed concerns that climate
changemay trigger evenmore farmland abandonment
with considerable social, and to a lesser extent,
economic consequences (Interview #25, 26). Indeed,
several studies have found that climatic determinants
may explain land abandonment patterns (Gellrich and
Zimmermann 2007, Arnaez et al 2011, García-Ruiz
et al 2011,Hatna andBakker 2011).
The state (Characteristic 1, table 2) of a piece of
land can be described in ﬁnancial terms. Whether the
land provides a viable ﬁnancial rate of return is deter-
mined by land, input and production costs; productiv-
ity and quality of outputs; market prices; and ancillary
income from subsidies or other farm activities. Fur-
thermore, the most proﬁtable farming activity at any
location is dependent on the local climate and biophy-
sical context. Climate change may alter the relative
productivity of crops in certain regions, making the
crop more favourable (unfavourable) if, on average,
climate moves closer to (further away from) the opti-
mum conditions for cultivating that crop (Prishche-
pov et al 2013). If land eventually is abandoned, this
also impacts wider rural communities. At some point,
what once was a lively agricultural area may have
become what one of the interviewees described as the
‘Spanish Laponia’: abandoned farmlands, villages with
little economic activity inhabited by mainly elderly
people and the schools, shops and churches closed
(Interview #25). The mechanism causing farmland
abandonment (Characteristic 2, table 2) is the choice-
process of individual farmers, inﬂuenced by several
feedbackmechanisms.Withmigrants leaving the area,
the rural area gets less attractive to live in—especially
for younger people, and the infrastructure remains
underdeveloped (Interview#25). This process is very
hard to reverse, which is reﬂected by many failed gov-
ernmental attempts to repopulate rural areas (Inter-
view #6). Concerning abruptness (Characteristic 3,
table 2), abandonment may happen either sudden or
gradually, depending on the interaction between
environmental and socio-economic conditions (Estel
et al 2015, Levers et al 2018).
From this case we take the following insights. First,
the clearest cases of tipping points are found on the
community scale, where reinforcing mechanisms can
rapidly change the socio-economic structure to a state
of abandonment. Second, in many places, adaptation
by irrigation has been effective in countering further
farmland abandonment and rural exodus (Iglesias et al
2018, Interview #25). Southeast Spain and the Ebro
Basin has taken-up a large amount of irrigation, and
with that, a change of crops towards water-intensive
cultivation such as maize (García-Ruiz and Lana-
Renault 2011). This, however led to severe over-
exploitation of water resources, aggravated by inap-
propriate crop choices due to subsidy schemes
(González-Gómez et al 2012). Considering that the
main social contribution of irrigation is rural employ-
ment (Gómez-Limón and Picazo-Tadeo 2012),
decreasing water availability may also tip some of the
currently irrigated areas to abandonment (Inter-
view#26).
4.3. SLR-inducedmigration
SLR constitutes a major threat for the densely popu-
lated coastal zones in Europe (Hinkel et al 2010,
IPCC 2014b, Vousdoukas et al 2018) and worldwide
(Hinkel et al 2014, IPCC 2019). Although ﬂood
defences can be upgraded to reduce damage, this is
economically efﬁcient during the 21st century for only
13%of the global coastline (comprising 90%of today’s
globalﬂoodplain population and 96%of today’s global
ﬂoodplain assets) (Lincke and Hinkel 2018). For the
protected areas, however, rising sea-levels increase the
potential of larger and larger ﬂood disasters in the case
of defence failure, because the ﬂoodplains, and ﬂood
depth in case of a disaster, continue to grow with SLR
irrespective of protection. Furthermore, coastal pro-
tection often attracts further development in the
ﬂoodplain, which further increases potential ﬂood
damages (Brown et al 2014, Hinkel et al 2018). After
the occurrence of a major ﬂood disaster, affected
regions can either decide to rebuild in the same site or
to retreat from the coast, which is the tipping point
considered here.
The state (Characteristic 1, table 2) of a coastal set-
tlement can be described in terms of its population
exposure: high and increasing exposure before and
low and decreasing exposure after the tipping point.
Three social mechanisms (Characteristic 2, table 2)
can cause a state shift from high to low population
exposure. The ﬁrst process is migration, which refers
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to permanent or semi-permanent voluntary human
mobility (Adger et al 2015). Migration is generally a
slow process, driven by complex interrelations
between many push and pull factors, and there is gen-
erally limited evidence that SLR (to date) has caused
coastal migration (Adger et al 2015, McLeman 2018).
The second process, displacement, refers to the invo-
luntary and unforeseen movement of people due to
armed conﬂicts or disasters (McLeman 2018, Mor-
treux et al 2018). Displacement is a fast process taking
place during, or in the direct aftermath, of a disaster.
The third process is relocation or managed retreat,
initiated, supervised and implemented by govern-
ments (Hino et al 2017, Mortreux et al 2018). It is a
slower process than displacement, but it is often initi-
ated after people have been displaced by disaster. With
rising sea levels, it is expected that governments will be
confrontedwith this decisionmore frequently.
The change in population exposure induced by
both forced displacement and planned relocation fol-
lowing a disaster is abrupt (Characteristic 3, table 2) as
compared to normal changes in population exposure
due to two reasons. First, displacement always is
abrupt as this is caused by a fast ﬂood disaster. Second,
relocation decisions by governments generally provide
incentives such as buy-outs for households to move
out of the hazard zone. For example, in the aftermath
of the coastal ﬂooding brought by Xynthia, the French
Government offered to fully compensate all home-
owners, based on the value of the real estate prior to
the storm and most homeowners accepted within a
year (Lumbroso and Vinet 2011). These kinds of
incentives are in addition to existing individual incen-
tives for migration and thus lead to faster population
change.
From this case we take the following insights. First,
the SETP of retreat from a coastal zone may be more
likely to be triggered by an extreme event (Interview
#10). Second, however, it could also be that adapta-
tion to the increasing ﬂood risk in itself causes a recon-
ﬁguration of the system (Interview#27, 28)which can
be so transformative that it is a ‘response to climate
change’ tipping point. This is for example seen in The
Netherlands, where new studies on extreme SLR
(DeConto and Pollard 2016, le Bars et al 2017) have
triggered the debate on a long-term water manage-
ment policy (Haasnoot et al 2018). Some radically dif-
ferent strategies are mentioned: the construction of a
large dike in front of the entire coast combined with a
permanent closure of all estuaries; elevating new
buildings above sea level (Aerts et al 2008); or strategic
retreat from areas with economic stagnation and
population decline (Olsthoorn et al 2008, van der
Meulen 2018). Third, in this context it is not only the
magnitude, but also the rate of SLR that could cause a
policy shift. It typically takes decades to prepare for
large infrastructural adaptation measures such as
ﬂood defences (Hallegatte et al 2012). The rate of
change may exceed the capacity of society to adapt in
the traditional way and trigger a shift towards more
transformative policies.
4.4. Generalisation of results
Table 3 lists the characteristics that SETPs may share,
drawing from the stakeholder interviews on other
SETP candidates (table SI 2.3, 2.4).
Concerning SETP descriptions, there are two
observations. First, it seems that the clearest examples
of SETPs are found on small system scales (table 3).
This not only holds for ski resorts, but also for agri-
culture, where interviewees (#2, 5, 6, 24, 25, 26, num-
bers refer to table SI 2.3, 2.4) could provide several
examples of local, abrupt transformations, but hesi-
tated to claim that this would lead to signiﬁcant coun-
try-scale economic effects. Vice versa, even the
interviewees that opposed the whole idea of the exis-
tence of tipping points in socio-economic systems,
agreed that some of the dynamics could be seen on a
small system scale, which they however did not con-
sider of enough concern to be called ‘real’ tipping
points (#27, 28). Second, it appears that descriptions
of SETPs are prone to a large degree of subjectivity.
This can relate to the fundamental question whether
there are critical thresholds at all, at which strong non-
linear behaviour occurs. For example, interviewee
#20 says: ‘In the health sector, we never speak of
thresholds, it is not that when a temperature surpasses
a certain degree that suddenly something happens.’,
whereas interviewee #18 gave several examples of
outbreaks of infectious diseases following environ-
mental conditions graduallymoving beyond threshold
conditions. Similarly, Interviewee #3 expects that in
case of a catastrophic dike-breach in the Netherlands,
‘they will think (K): there is no way of recovery’, and
the delta will be irreversibly changed. In contrast,
interviewee #28 argues that ‘even if there would be a
large ﬂood event, we probably will rebuild.Wewill not
move to higher grounds. That is so contrary to Dutch
nature.’ On the same casus, Interviewee #27 high-
lights another dimension of subjectivity. Coastal
retreat could be a tipping point from a social, but not
an economic point of view—from which it simply is a
continuation of the rational cost-beneﬁt analysis
which also underpins the current policy. ‘People don’t
like change, but whether it is a dramatic problem from
an economic point of view, remains a question.’
Concerning mechanisms causing SETPs, inter-
viewees distinguished several mechanisms that can
push the socio-economic system over a tipping point.
Most frequently mentioned, was a series of unfavour-
able conditions, that eventually tips the system into a
new state. Above, we illustrated this for ski resorts and
interviewees highlighted similar dynamics for farm-
land abandonment, collapse of insurance markets and
willingness to rebuild after devastating hurricanes
(table 3). In many cases, these extremes are perturba-
tions on top of a gradual trend moving towards
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threshold conditions. Many of these thresholds are an
interplay between climatic and ﬁnancial factors: for
proﬁtable operation, agriculture needs a minimum
amount of water and ski resorts a minimum amount
of days with sufﬁcient snow cover. In some cases, this
implies that favourable conditions (for example for a
certain crop) may shift from one region to another,
which on the local level causes relatively abrupt shifts
(for example in agricultural practices). Sometimes,
governments need to radically reform their policies to
maintain certain levels of performance. As we illu-
strated for the case of SLR, it can be the rate rather than
themagnitude of change which exceeds society’s capa-
city to respond and causes a system shift. As inter-
viewee 10 puts it: ‘One of the biggest threats to society
is that the changes in the climate and the weather hap-
pen so rapidly, that we do not, or inadequately, have
abilities to adapt to these changes.’
In almost every case, interviewees highlighted a
combination of climatic and co-determining socio-
Table 3. SETP characteristics brought-up by stakeholders during interviews.
Characteristic Examples in interviews (numbers refer to interviews in table SI 2.3, 2.4)
Deﬁnition and examples of SETPs, description of critical thresholds and description of stable states
The tipping point occurs on a small system scale Agricultural shifts and farmland abandonment happen in certain
regions of Spain, but these contribute little to total national agri-
cultural income (6, 24, 25, 26, see 2, 5).Many low-altitude ski resorts
may collapse, but themost well-known ski resorts are located at
higher altitudes (8, 22, 23). Outbreaks of vector-borne diseases are
more likely in relativelywarm cities (18)
Conﬂicting views onwhether climate changemay cause a tip-
ping point in the sector
Large and abrupt socio-economic impacts upon falling belowwater
availability thresholds (10 versus 19). Vector-borne diseases and epi-
demics (18 versus 20). The possibility of abrupt retreat from the
DutchDelta (3, 4, 15 versus 27, 28)
Tipping points aremore likely in developing countries than in
Europe
Explicit statement (8). Sea-level rise induced retreat ismore likely in
Island states and parts of Bangladesh (10). Heat stress is a larger con-
cern in India (10). Droughtsmay causemigration out of the fertile
crescent (10)
Whether the new state is (un)favourable is a subjective issue Disappearing of rivers with large iconic/religious value is a tipping point
for certain groups (10). Collapse of certain agricultural systemsmay
be favourable for the environment (24). Collapse of ski resorts could
be favoured over adaptationwith adverse impacts on nature (23).
Coastal retreat can be very unfavourable for some groups: a social tip-
ping point, but still rational from a cost-beneﬁt perspective: not an
economic tipping point (27)
Mechanisms leading to the occurrence of SETPs
Co-determining drivers contribute to eroding system resilience Depletion of fossil fuels (1), consumer behaviour steering demand for
cheap and unsustainable agricultural production (2),K,amain dri-
vers for farmland abandonment are economic and demographic (25,
26), affordability ofﬂood protection is determined byGDP-growth
(27, 28)
SETP is caused by a gradual increase of risk or economic unfa-
vourability, causing amarket/policy reconﬁguration
Insurance premiums rise above affordability threshold (3, 15). Collapse
of a local ski resort because it is unproﬁtable (8, 22, 23). Nobodywants
to take over a small, unproﬁtable farm (25). It is no longer cost-effec-
tive to protect a coastal community (4, 10, 27, 28). Trafﬁc disruptions
rise above formal or acceptability threshold (17). Economically (un)
favourable climatic conditions shift and causemigration over the
boundaries of nation states (10)
SETP is caused by a series of unfavourable climatic conditions Recurring crop failures/droughtsmakes farmers stop their business (2,
6, 25). Frequent hits of hurricanes or ﬂoods prevents from rebuilding
certain areas (3). Recurring droughts causemigration ﬂows (2).
Recurring unfavourable snow conditions cause collapse of ski resorts
(22, 23). Two years of large damage push insurance premiums over
affordability threshold (2)
Disaster triggers a response tipping point A disaster triggers rapid uptake of sustainable energy (1, 12). Floods trig-
ger retreat from vulnerable areas (3, 4) or amajor revision ofﬂood-
risk strategy (4, 15)
The rate of change, rather than themagnitude of change, is
causing an SETP
Explicit statement (10)
Tipping point is caused by cascading infrastructural effects Floods disrupt the road network (15, 17, 21) and cause electricity fail-
ure (15)
a Almost each interviewee refered to co-determining drivers, see table SI 2.4.
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economic conditions, which together explain a state
shift: the resilience of a system against biophysical
change already has been depleted by economic, demo-
graphic or social mechanisms (table SI 2.4). Nonlinear
positive (self-enforcing) feedbacks in the socio-eco-
nomic system may accelerate a transition. For exam-
ple, increasing risk raises insurance premiums, which
reduces their affordability, which in turn decreases the
insurance uptake, which raises the premiums even
further (Interview #3, 15). Similarly, concerns about
the proﬁtability of ski resorts may hinder further
investments in the winter tourism sector, and
rumours about accelerating SLR may worsen the
investment climate of a delta which reduces the funds
available forﬂood protection.
5.Discussion
Reﬂecting on the results of the stakeholder consulta-
tion against what is present in the tipping point
literature to date, weﬁnd the following.
First, change in the socio-economic system is the
outcome of complex environmental and socio-eco-
nomic drivers, as well as policy interventions. Conse-
quently, the role of the climate driver can be difﬁcult to
attribute for each SETP example, particularly for
impact SETPs. One should be careful not to over-
emphasize the role of biophysical change while
neglecting the co-determining social, political and
economic variables. Such a ‘naïve’ approach has
received criticism in the literature on migration, the
collapse of ancient societies and the impacts of natural
disasters (Butzer 2012, Bettini 2017, Freeman 2017,
Soens 2018). A relatively ‘slow’ process such as climate
change will most likely only cause abrupt change of a
socio-economic system when the system was already
on the edge of its resilience due to co-determining fac-
tors, or when there is a very large disaster-like pertur-
bation, or recurring smaller disasters, on top of the
gradual trend (van Nes et al 2016). This also implies
that impact SETPs are more likely to be found outside
Europe, in developing countries with less socio-eco-
nomic resilience against climate shocks (table 3, see
Hinkel et al 2018 for an example for SLR).
Second, there are limitations to the proposed dis-
tinction between SETPs in terms of impacts and
response. In practice, socio-economic impact and
response are closely interrelated. Adaptation andmiti-
gation measures can help to avoid some SETPs,
although there are physical, economic and social limits
to thesemeasures, so that tipping points cannot always
be avoided but possibly delayed. In some cases, the
time required to implement adaptation measures
becomes a limiting factor. This highlights that not only
themagnitude, but also the rate of climate changemay
cause a tipping point. SETPs can thus occur because
the rate of change exceeds society’s capacity to adapt.
Furthermore, some proposed adaptationmeasures are
so transformative, that theirmere implementation can
be considered a response SETP.
Third, SETPs are more likely to be found on small
system scales. On larger scales, economies are more
diverse so that collapsing sectors may be substituted.
At the same time, there are cases where small scale tip-
ping points may aggregate to larger-scale socio-eco-
nomic impacts, for example in a region with many
low-lying ski resorts or a region with many vulnerable
farms. This is in line with complex system theory,
which indicates that homogeneous and inter-
connected systems aremore likely to exhibit wide scale
tipping (Scheffer et al 2012). This also conﬁrms the
ﬁnding that although societal-wide collapse is seldom
observed, natural disasters may have a large local
impact on individuals and communities (Soens 2018).
Fourth, in this context, the stakeholder workshop
illuminated tensions between different ways of framing
tipping points. The concept had large policy resonance
because of its popular meaning as ‘large impact event’.
This, however, caused a disregard of the system-
dynamic properties of tipping points among workshop
participants. In contrast, strict system-dynamic deﬁni-
tions of tipping points are found on small system scales
in which policy makers showed less interest from a
macro-economic perspective. Consequently, stake-
holder consultation does not guarantee that all collected
examples align with a (stricter) tipping point deﬁnition
and should therefore be complemented with a concise
evaluation of the characteristics of the examples sup-
plied, to identify those that classify as tipping points.
Nevertheless, these academia-stakeholder conversa-
tions were perceived as helpful. For academia, because
it helped to describe indicators for system states in a
policy-relevant way. For policy makers, because dialo-
gue on system dynamics enhanced system under-
standing and helped to ﬁnd better management
strategies to avoid impact SETPs.
Fifth, including socio-economic dynamics adds an
extra layer of complexity compared to the studies which
only include biophysical dynamics. Prediction of occur-
rence and likelihood of SETPs is complicated by (a) the
complexity and dynamic character of the socio-eco-
nomic system and (b) the fact that humans proactively
and autonomously may alter the system. In response to
changing conditions, the socio-economic system might
deliberately have been changed before the tipping was
predicted. There is an increasing body of regime shifts
literature in which these biophysical and socio-eco-
nomic dynamics are studied in an integrated way under
headings like CHANS (coupled-human and natural sys-
tems); SES (socio-ecological systems) and CHES (cou-
pled human-environment systems). The model
approaches in this literature (such as system-dynamic
and agent-based models, see table SI 1.2) are suitable to
study the dynamics of stylized cases to increase system
understanding. So far, however, this literature has little
coverage from the perspective of climate change (Aerts
et al 2018). Also, because of its often stylized character, it
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gives little concrete suggestions for adaptation and miti-
gation strategies for policymakers.
To illustrate the last point, consider the potential
impacts of accounting for SETPs in cost-beneﬁt-analysis
(CBA), a common tool for guiding climate policy
(Tol 2003). Accounting for climate tipping points may
signiﬁcantly alter CBA because the extra economic
damage justiﬁesmore radicalmitigation policies, such as
a higher carbon tax reﬂecting the higher social cost of
carbon (Lenton and Ciscar 2013, Cai et al 2015, 2016,
Van Der Ploeg 2016). Similarly, any additional damage
from passing impact SETPs increases the costs of inac-
tion, making mitigation measures more cost-effective.
On a local scale, the inclusion of SETPs will mainly
increase the beneﬁts of local adaptation measures. Fur-
thermore, when evaluating a management strategy that
could lead to an impact SETP, one should account for
additional transfer costs to an alternative strategy at
somepoint in the future (Haasnoot et al2019).
6. Conclusion
This paper set out to deﬁne and characterize SETPs, to
identify policy-relevant examples and to give recom-
mendations for further research. We showed how
SETPs can be deﬁned along the same characteristics as
biophysical tipping points and suggested a distinction
between: (a) SETPs in terms of transformational
response to climate change and (b) SETPs in terms of
socio-economic impacts. Impact SETPs, where slow-
onset changes in the biophysical system cause strong
nonlinear behaviour in the socio-economic system,
have least coverage in the literature. The stakeholder
process delivered 22 candidate SETPs, which mostly
have some general coverage in the literature, but not
speciﬁcally froma tipping point perspective.
How could further SETP research support deci-
sion making on climate adaptation and mitigation?
We propose the following research agenda:
• For small-scale SETPs, develop models (e.g. agent-
based or system-dynamic) that can represent the
nonlinear dynamics causing regime shifts in socio-
economic systems upon gradual change in the
biophysical system.
Use these models to assess the effectiveness of
different adaptation andmonitoring strategies.
Investigate the different mechanisms identiﬁed in
the above stakeholder consultation, notably under
what conditions the rate-of-change (rather than the
magnitude of change) causes an SETP.
Investigate how, and under what conditions, small
scale SETPs may scale up to wider socio-economic
impacts.
• Study the wider (macro)economic impacts of SETPs
by representing the new states in partial equilibrium
models of speciﬁc sectors, or in general equilibrium
models to study economy-wide consequences.
Investigate how the likelihood and impact of SETPs
can be reduced bymitigation policy.
• When SETPs cannot explicitly be modelled or
quantiﬁed, use stakeholder consultation to identify
potential thresholds indicating SETPs and to inves-
tigate their causalmechanisms.
• Explore the exceedance of these thresholds in
climate and socio-economic scenarios.
• Use stakeholder-thresholds to deﬁne maximum
levels of change (e.g. a temperature limit, or several
consecutive unproﬁtable years) at which SETPs
most likely will not occur.
Finally, it is clear that impact SETPs could have
major policy consequences but have been omitted
from many European and national impact studies to
date. Including them in the academic literature and in
policy discussion is therefore a useful addition for
informing soundmitigation and adaptation strategies.
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